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FT4	Data	Analysis	Summary	(SSI-ARC)	Doug	Isaacson,	Chester	Gong,	Scott	Reardon,	Confesor	Santiago	12	DEC	2016	
Abstract	Standards	for	Unmanned	Aircraft	System	(UAS)	Detect-and-Avoid	(DAA)	systems	are	currently	being	developed	under	the	auspices	of	the	RTCA	Special	Committee	228	(SC-228).		To	support	the	development	of	these	standards,	a	series	of	flight	tests	has	been	conducted	at	NASA’s	Armstrong	Flight	Research	Center	(NASA-AFRC).		The	fourth	in	this	series	of	flight	test	activities	(Flight	Test	4,	or	simply	FT4)	was	conducted	during	the	Spring	and	Summer	of	2016.		FT4	supported	the	objectives	of	numerous	organizations	working	toward	UAS	DAA	Minimum	Operational	Performance	Standards	(MOPS)	and	UAS	DAA	Radar	MOPS.		The	summary	provided	herein	is	limited	to	the	objectives,	analysis	and	conclusions	of	the	NASA	Ames	Research	Center	(NASA-ARC)	SSI	team	toward	the	refinement	of	UAS	DAA	MOPS.		This	document	provides	a	high-level	overview	of	FT4	and	the	SSI-ARC	objectives,	a	summary	of	the	data	analysis	methodology	and	recommendations	for	UAS	DAA	MOPS	refinements	based	on	the	data	analysis	results.	A	total	of	72	encounters	were	flown	to	support	SSI-ARC	objectives.		Test	results	were	generally	consistent	with	acceptable	UAS	DAA	system	performance	and	will	be	considered	in	broader	SC-228	requirements	validation	efforts.		Observed	alert	lead	times	indicated	acceptable	UAS	DAA	alerting	performance.	Effective	interoperability	between	the	UAS	DAA	system	and	the	Traffic	Alert	and	Collision	Avoidance	System	(TCAS)	was	observed	with	one	notable	exception:	TCAS	Resolutions	Advisories	(RA)	were	observed	in	the	absence	of	any	DAA	alert	on	two	occasions,	indicating	the	need	for	alert	parameter	refinement.	Findings	further	indicated	the	need	for	continued	work	in	the	areas	of	DAA	Well	Clear	Recovery	logic	and	alert	stability	for	Mode-C-only	intruders.		Finally,	results	demonstrated	a	high	level	of	compliance	with	a	set	of	evaluation	criteria	designed	to	provide	anecdotal	evidence	of	acceptable	UAS	DAA	system	performance.	
System	Under	Test:	JADEM	FT4	was	conducted	at	NASA-AFRC	between	April	and	June	of	2016.		NASA’s	Ikhana	research	aircraft	and	Ground	Control	Station	(GCS)	were	equipped	with	the	necessary	hardware,	displays	and	software	to	evaluate	three	prototype	UAS	DAA	systems:	NASA	Daedalus,	NASA	Java	Architecture	for	Detect	and	Avoid	Extensibility	and	Modeling	(JADEM)	and	General	Atomics	Aeronautical	Systems,	Inc.	Conflict	Prediction	and	Display	System	(CPDS).	While	each	system	was	developed	to	be	as	consistent	with	the	developing	SC-228	MOPS	as	practical,	there	were	key	differences	in	their	implementation	that	preclude	aggregating	FT4	results	across	the	systems	under	test	(SUTs).	This	document	provides	the	analysis	methodology	and	results	for	flight	testing	of	the	NASA	SSI-ARC-developed	JADEM	system.		
Alerting	Criteria		The	FT4	JADEM	implementation	employed	the	same	alerting	criteria	and	display	symbology	utilized	in	the	NASA	Part	Task	6	(PT6)	study,	as	shown	in	Table	1.	Alerting	hysteresis,	as	defined	in	the	draft	DAA	MOPS,	was	implemented	for	FT4	(minimum	4-second	alert	persistence	unless	superseded	by	higher	priority	alert).	
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Omnibands	Guidance	The	JADEM	system	provides	guidance	to	the	UAS	pilot	in	the	form	of	heading/altitude	bands,	the	color	of	which	indicates	the	level	of	alert	that	would	result	if	the	ownship	were	to	initiate	a	turn/altitude-change	to	the		heading/altitude	depicted.		Green	banding	indicates	a	turn/altitude	change	to	the	depicted	heading/altitude	is	not	predicted	to	result	in	a	Loss	of	Well	Clear	(LoWC).		Yellow	banding	indicates	a	turn/altitude-change	is	predicted	to	cause	a	DAA	Corrective	Alert	(i.e.	potential	LoWC	in	the	next	25-55s).		Lastly,	red	banding	indicates	a	turn/altitude-change	is	predicted	to	cause	a	DAA	Warning	Alert	(i.e.	potential	LoWC	in	the	next	25	s	or	less).			Figure	1	depicts	sample	Omnibands	guidance	as	would	be	displayed	in	the	UAS	GCS;	a	“Corrective”	DAA	Alert	is	displayed	for	the	only	displayed	intruder.		The	guidance	illustrated	in	Figure	1	indicates	viable	maneuvers	to	remain	well	clear	are	available	in	both	the	heading		(~15	degrees	left	or	right)	and		altitude	(+600	ft	or	-400	ft)	bands.		
Table	1:	JADEM	FT4	Alerting	Criteria	
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Figure	1:	Sample	JADEM	Omnibands	Guidance		Omnibands	guidance	for	multiple	intruders	is	produced	by	forming	the	union	of	individual	omnibands	guidance	for	each	intruder	within	the	field	of	regard,	with	higher	priority	alerts	overriding	lower	priorities	when	alerts	differ	between	intruders	for	a	given	heading/altitude	level.		Additionally,	the	following	assumptions	and	parameters	were	used	in	the	JADEM	guidance	and	alerting	logic	for	FT4:	1. Ownship	assumed	to	execute	turns	at	a	constant	rate	of	3	deg/s	2. Ownship	assumed	to	climb	or	descend	at	constant	rate	of	1000	ft/min	3. Omnibands	heading	guidance	limited	within	+/-	100	degrees	of	current	ownship	heading	4. Omnibands	heading	guidance	provided	with	1	degree	resolution/discretization	5. Omnibands	altitude	guidance	limited	within	+/-	3000	feet		of	current	ownship	altitude	6. Omnibands	altitude	guidance	provided	with	100	ft	altitude	discretization		
Well	Clear	Recovery	Guidance	Well	Clear	Recovery	(WCR)	guidance	refers	to	guidance	that	is	provided	to	the	UAS	pilot	to	regain	Well	Clear	from	all	intruders.	JADEM	was	configured	for	FT4	to	provide	WCR	guidance	when	no	allowable	ownship	maneuver	is	predicted	to	remain	well	clear	of	all	intruders.		It	should	be	noted	that	this	implementation	exceeds	the	minimum	MOPS	requirements	(which	only	requires	WCR	guidance	when	a	LoWC	has	already	occurred).	Figure	2	illustrates	WCR	guidance	as	implemented	in	JADEM	for	FT4;	the	red	horizontal	banding	indicates	no	viable	maneuvers	are	predicted	to	remain	Well	Clear,	and	the	green	WCR	“wedge”	indicates	the	advised	direction	and	rough	magnitude	of	horizontal	maneuver	that	will	result	in	regaining	Well	Clear	in	a	safe	and	timely	manner.		Determination	of	a	“safe	and	timely”	maneuver	is	dictated	by	evaluation	of	a	WCR	cost	function.		
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The	JADEM	WCR	cost	function	for	FT4	considers	a	number	of	factors,	but	is	most	influenced	by	the	proximity	of	the	predicted	Closest	Point	of	Approach	(CPA)	to	the	accepted	NMAC	volume	and	secondarily	by	the	desire	to	maintain	consistent	WCR	guidance	(changes	in	turn	direction	incur	a	cost	penalty).		Finally,	vertical	JADEM	WCR	guidance	was	not	provided	for	FT4	to	prevent	the	UAS	pilot	from	maneuvering	vertically	near	the	collision	avoidance	boundary	against	cooperative	intruders	(which	may	degrade	Traffic	Alert	and	Collision	Avoidance	System(TCAS)	II	performance)	and	due	to	vertical	state	estimation	uncertainties	for	intruders	tracked	solely	by	the	radar	(i.e.	non-cooperative	intruders).		
	
Figure	2:	Sample	WCR	Guidance	
	
Traffic	Alert	and	Collision	Avoidance	System	(TCAS)	Interoperability	Implementation	One	of	the	primary	objectives	of	FT4	was	to	evaluate	the	UAS	DAA-TCAS	Interoperability	concept	developed	since	FT3.		The	following	four	heuristics	summarize	the	DAA	TCAS	Interoperability	Concept	as	implemented	in	JADEM	for	FT4:	1. Any	intruder	with	an	active	corrective	Resolution	Advisory	(RA)	is	removed	from	all	DAA	guidance	calculations	a. Horizontal	DAA	guidance	will	be	shown	for	non-RA	aircraft		b. All	DAA	vertical	guidance	is	suppressed	during	a	corrective	RA	2. During	a	preventive	RA,	TCAS	guidance	is	an	input	to	the	DAA	vertical	guidance	to	ensure	any	vertical	DAA	guidance	is	consistent	(e.g.	DO	NOT	CLIMB)	with	the	RA	guidance	3. Any	time	ownship’s	compliance	with	a	corrective	RA	leads	to	a	secondary	DAA	Warning	alert	(maneuver	now),	DAA	guidance	shall	revert	to	well	clear	recovery	in	order	to	be	more	direct	with	guidance,	e.g.:	a. Compliance	with	TCAS	‘DESCEND’	RA	leads	to	a	secondary	DAA	Warning	b. Rather	than	show	the	pilot	full	Omnibands	suggestive	guidance,	limited	suggestive	guidance	is	displayed	(e.g.	maneuver	left)	
High	
Bound 
Low	Bound 
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FT4	Objectives	and	Methodology	for	JADEM	Analysis	Each	of	the	FT4	systems	under	test	(SUTs)	was	evaluated	independently,	and	each	according	to	objectives	and	analysis	methodologies	tailored	to	their	specific	implementation	of	the	draft	SC-228	UAS	DAA	MOPS	requirements.		This	section	describes	the	FT4	objectives,	scenario	development	and	analysis	methodology	developed	and	employed	for	the	JADEM	system	under	test.	
SSI-ARC	FT4	Objectives	and	Scenario	Generation	A	set	of	high-level	test	objectives	were	developed	to	support	the	development	of	the	SC-228	UAS	DAA	MOPS.		The	following	four	high-level	test	objectives	were	used	to	guide	the	FT4	planning,	conduct	and	analysis	of	JADEM	alerting	and	guidance	logic:	1. Validate	DAA	requirements	in	stressing	cases	that	drive	MOPS	requirements,	including:	High-speed	cooperative	intruder,	Low-speed	non-cooperative	intruder,	high	vertical	closure	rate	encounter,	and	Mode	C/S-only	intruder	(i.e.	without	ADS-B).	2. Validate	TCAS/DAA	alerting	and	guidance	interoperability	concept	in	the	presence	of	realistic	sensor,	tracking	and	navigational	errors	and	in	multiple-intruder	encounters	against	both	cooperative	and	non-cooperative	intruders.	3. Validate	“Well	Clear	Recovery”	guidance	requirements	in	the	presence	of	realistic	sensor,	tracking	and	navigational	errors.	4. Validate	DAA	alerting	and	guidance	requirements	in	the	presence	of	realistic	sensor,	tracking	and	navigational	errors.	In	support	of	these	objectives,	a	series	of	encounters	were	scripted	to	address	each	objective.		The	development	of	each	scenario	required	identification	of:	the	primary	high-level	objective	being	addressed,	the	encounter	geometry,	intruder	equipage,	data	collection	requirements,	encounter	methodology	(including	pilot	instructions),	checks	to	ensure	data	quality,		draft	MOPS	reference,	and	evaluation	criteria	to	determine	whether	or	not	the	test	objectives	were	met.		A	sample	scenario	template	resulting	from	this	process	is	included	as	Figure	3.		The	SSI-ARC	team	subsequently	coordinated	with	AFRC	flight	test	personnel		to	refine	the	scenarios	outlined	in	the	templates	for	production	of	flight	“test	cards”	providing	the	level	of	detail	necessary	to	train	ownship	and	intruder	pilots	and	execute	the	scripted	scenario	on	the	day	of	the	flight.		In	total,	72	test	cards	were	developed	and	flown	for	FT4	JADEM	analysis;	a	sample	test	card	is	included	as	Figure	4.		
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Analysis	Methodology	The	analysis	methodology	was	designed	to	address	the	“evaluation	criteria”	identified	for	each	scenario	template.		As	such,	the	following	key	event	data	were	extracted	from	the	recorded	flight	test	data	for	each	test	card:		
• First	Track:	First	recorded	track	for	each	intruder	in	the	encounter	
• DAA	Preventive	Alert:		Onset(s)	of	DAA	Preventive	alert(s)	(for	each	new	occurrence)	
• DAA	Corrective	Alert:	Onset(s)	of	DAA	Corrective	alerts(s)	(for	each	new	occurrence)	
• DAA	Warning	Alert:		Onset(s)	of	DAA	Warning	alerts(s)	(for	each	new	occurrence)	
• LoWC:	Onset	of	each	new	Loss	of	Well	Clear	(may	be	multiple	LoWCs	and/or	LoWC	for	multiple	intruders)	
• Regain	Well	Clear:		first	time	at	which	Well	Clear	is	regained	after	a	LoWC	event.	
• Closest	Point	of	Approach:	time(s)	at	which	minimum	slant	range	is	achieved	during	the	encounter	for	each	intruder	
• TCAS	Event:		Time	of	initial	TCAS	Preventive	or	Corrective	Alert	and	any	associated	guidance	(or	TCAS	all	clear	message)	
• Well	Clear	Recovery:	Onset	of	WCR	guidance	and	associated	direction	(e.g.	turn	right)	as	well	as	any	changes	to	direction	of	guidance	
• Final	Alert:		The	last	recorded	alert	for	each	intruder	in	the	encounter	
• Last	Track:	Last	recorded	track	for	each	intruder	in	the	encounter	These	events	were	logged	to	a	database	that	was	used	in	the	analysis	to	determine	if	events	occurred	in	the	proper	sequence	(e.g.	TCAS	Corrective	RAs	were	preceded	by	DAA	corrective	or	warning	alerts)	and	with	appropriate	timing,	as	dictated	by	each	encounter’s	evaluation	criteria.	Table	2	includes	the	extracted	events	from	a	single	FT4	JADEM	encounter.	
Table	2:	Sample	Encounter	Event	Table	Cycle	Count	 Intruder	 Time	 Clock	Time	 Event	191	 N3GC	 1461942437.39	 15:07:17	 FIRST_TRACK	198	 N3GC	 1461942445.37	 15:07:25	 DAA_PREVENTATIVE	203	 N3GC	 1461942450.38	 15:07:30	 DAA_CORRECTIVE	208	 N3GC	 1461942455.41	 15:07:35	 DAA_PREVENTATIVE	215	 N3GC	 1461942462.35	 15:07:42	 DAA_CORRECTIVE	233	 N3GC	 1461942480.40	 15:08:00	 DAA_WARNING	257	 n/a	 1461942504.39	 15:08:24	 WCR_TURN_RIGHT	258	 N3GC	 1461942505.38	 15:08:25	 LOWC	270	 N3GC	 1461942518.39	 15:08:38	 TCAS_CLIMB	291	 N3GC	 1461942539.39	 15:08:59	 CPA	291	 N3GC	 1461942539.39	 15:08:59	 TCAS_LEVEL_OFF	296	 N3GC	 1461942544.36	 15:09:04	 TCAS_AA_CLEAR	297	 N3GC	 1461942545.39	 15:09:05	 DAA_PREVENTATIVE	297	 N3GC	 1461942545.39	 15:09:05	 REGAIN_WC	300	 N3GC	 1461942548.40	 15:09:08	 FINAL_ALERT	308	 N3GC	 1461942556.36	 15:09:16			
LAST_TRACK	
		
9		
Also	supporting	the	assessment	of	evaluation	criteria	were	aircraft	state	data,	alerting	threat	parameter	data,	intruder	relative	state	data,	and	omnibands	guidance	data.		Examples	of	data	plots	for	each	of	these	are	shown	in	Figures	5-8.	
	
Figure	5:	Sample	Aircraft	State	Data	Plots	
	
Figure	6:	Sample	Alerting	Threat	Parameter	Data	Plots	
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Figure	7:	Sample	Intruder	Relative	State	Data	Plots	
	
Figure	8:	Sample	Omnibands	Data	Plots	
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In	each	of	the	aircraft	state	plots	(Figure	5),	relative	state	plots	(Figure	6)	and	alerting	threat	data	plots	(Figure	7),	the	color	of	the	filled-circle	markers	transposed	on	the	data	plot	trace	indicates	the	type	of	DAA	alert:	DAA	preventive	(black),	DAA	corrective	(orange),	and	DAA	warning	(red)	alerts.		Additionally,	the	background	color	coding	on	the	Omnibands	data	plots	(refer	to	Figure	8)	is	consistent	with	the	Omnibands	coloring	predicting	no	LoWC	(green),	LoWC	within	25-55	s	(yellow)	and	LoWC	within	the	next	25	s	(red)	at	the	indicated	heading/altitude.		Lastly,	the	Omnibands	data	plots	also	indicate	when	WCR	guidance	(yellow	triangle	markers)	and/or	TCAS	RAs	(magenta	triangle	markers)	are	present.		Omnibands	data	plots	were	used	to	assess	DAA-TCAS	interoperability.	Finally,	video	recordings	of	the	UAS	DAA	JADEM	display	were	reviewed	to	provide	any	additional	details	necessary	to	assess	the	performance	of	the	DAA	system	against	the	scenario	evaluation	criteria.	
Results	
Scenario	Evaluation	Criteria	Compliance	The	first	element	of	the	analysis	focused	on	evaluation	of	the	Boolean	evaluation	criteria	for	each	scenario.		Eight	evaluation	criteria	were	assessed	as	part	of	this	analysis	(FT4	JADEM	compliance	with	each	criterion	is	provided	in	parenthesis)	1. A	DAA	Corrective	Alert	is	issued	to	the	UAS	Pilot	(94%)	2. Ownship	remains	Well	Clear	of	intruders	(90%)	3. DAA	Alerts	are	removed	once	clear	of	threat	(100%)	4. DAA	Alerts	and	Guidance	are	provided	to	the	UAS	Pilot	following	the	expiration	of	a	TCAS	RA,	if	appropriate	according	to	the	DAA	alerting	thresholds	(100%)	5. DAA	Alerts	and	Guidance	are	removed	for	intruders	with	Corrective	TCAS	RA	Guidance	(90%)	6. Well	Clear	Recovery	Guidance	is	provided	when	no	viable	maneuvers	are	predicted	to	remain	well	clear	of	all	intruders	(100%)	7. UAS	Pilot	maneuvers	in	response	to	WCR	guidance	and	regains	Well	Clear	(100%)	8. UAS	Pilot	maneuvers	in	response	to	and	consistent	with	corrective	TCAS	RA	guidance	(100%)	Data	analysis	demonstrated	a	generally	high	level	of	compliance	with	the	evaluation	test	criteria,	with	a	few	notable	instances	of	non-compliance.	These	non-compliances	were	evaluated	on	a	case-by-case	basis	as	follows:	
Failure	to	Provide	Corrective	Alert:	All	cases	in	which	a	DAA	Corrective	alert	was	not	issued	prior	to	higher	priority	alerts	occurred	due	to	the	DAA	Corrective	and	Warning	Alerts	having	the	same	HMD	threshold.		Scenarios	developed	to	evaluate	TCAS	interoperability	were	scripted	with	intruders	maneuvering	to	intercept	the	course	of	the	UAS	ownship	within	close	temporal	proximity	to	the	predicted	CPA.		The	result	of	this	is	that	the	predicted	modified	tau	of	these	encounters	was	generally	below	the	DAA	Warning	Alert	threshold	prior	to	the	intercept	maneuver,	while	the	predicted	HMD	did	not	meet	the	HMD	criterion	for	DAA	Corrective.		As	the	intruder	turned	to	intercept	the	UAS	ownship,	the	predicted	HMD	rapidly	decreased	in	value	until	it	met	the	DAA	Warning	alert	HMD	threshold	and	a	DAA	Warning	Alert	was	issued	without	a	prior	corrective	alert	due	to	the	
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low	modified	tau	value	at	the	time	of	the	maneuver.		While	increasing	the	DAA	Corrective	Alert	HMD	value	in	these	cases	would	lead	to	the	preferred	alert	sequencing	(DAA	Corrective	Alert	preceding	DAA	Warning	Alert),	it	is	unclear	if	such	a	change	is	necessary.	Increasing	the	DAA	Corrective	Alert	HMD	value	should	be	considered	in	the	context	of	the	tradeoff	between	increased	DAA	Corrective	Alert	rate	and	the	rate	of	occurrence	of	encounters	in	actual	operations	that	would	otherwise	lead	to	the	undesirable	alert	sequence.	These	non-compliances	are	believed	to	be	an	artifact	of	a	carefully	planned	test	maneuver	and	are	expected	to	be	uncommon	in	actual	operations;	an	analysis	of	encounters	anticipated	in	actual	operations	is	necessary	to	corroborate	this	expectation.	
Failure	to	Remain	Well	Clear:	The	evaluation	criteria	to	remain	well	clear	only	applied	to	mitigated	encounters	in	which	pilots	were	instructed	to	follow	DAA	guidance.		For	such	encounters,	UAS	pilots	were	instructed	to:	1)	postpone	maneuvers	until	a	DAA	Warning	Alert	had	been	issued,	2)	maneuver	to	the	edge	of	the	green	guidance	band	in	the	direction	of	their	choice	(if	more	than	one	option	was	provided),	and	3)	to	only	maneuver	once	(no	corrections	to	initial	maneuver	allowed).		These	instructions	were	provided	with	the	intention	of	isolating	JADEM	performance	from	the	pilot’s	ability	to	accommodate	shortcomings	in	DAA	system	performance	in	remaining	Well	Clear	(e.g.	by	adding	his/her	own	excess	maneuver	buffers	or	making	adjustments	to	the	initial	maneuver	to	counter	poor	JADEM	trajectory	predictions	or	guidance	instabilities).		Such	pilot	response	to	a	DAA	Corrective	Alert	in	operational	use	of	JADEM	would	be	consistent	with	a	pilot	assessing	the	predicted	LoWC,	and	delaying	maneuvering	pending	further	development	of	the	encounter	or	until	a	higher	priority	task	is	completed.		While	delaying	UAS	maneuvering	to	avoid	LoWC	until	a	DAA	Warning	Alert	is	received	should	generally	not	lead	to	LoWC,	such	delays	would	result	in	higher	rate	of	LoWC	(acceptable	rates	of	LoWC	in	this	case	are	beyond	the	scope	of	FT4).		The	pilot	instruction	to	only	maneuver	once	for	a	given	encounter	removes	the	pilot’s	ability	to	react	to	the	uncertainties	of	developing	encounters	and	artificially	increases	the	rate	of	LoWC;	refinements	to	UAS	maneuvers	to	remain	Well	Clear	are	to	be	expected	in	actual	use	of	a	DAA	system.	Given	the	pilot	instructions	in	the	use	of	JADEM	in	FT4,	it	is	somewhat	surprising	that	LoWCs	only	occurred	in	2	of	the	20	mitigated	encounters.		Both	instances	were	the	result	of	modest	intruder	accelerations:	increased	ground	speed	in	one	case	and	a	slowly	arcing	turn	toward	the	UAS	in	the	second.		It	is	likely	that	both	LoWCs	would	have	been	avoided	with	earlier	ownship	maneuvering	(in	response	to	the	initial	DAA	Corrective	alerts)	and	the	allowance	of	maneuver	adjustments	to	account	for	maneuvering	intruders.	
Failure	to	Remove	DAA	Guidance	for	Intruders	with	Corrective	RA	Guidance:		The	TCAS	interoperability	concept	implemented	for	FT4	required	that	intruders	involved	in	a	TCAS	corrective	RA	be	removed	from	consideration	for	DAA	Alerting	and	Guidance	consideration.		While	this	was	implemented	in	the	JADEM	software,	3	instances	of	concurrent	JADEM	DAA	and	TCAS	RA	guidance	were	observed	during	FT4.		Each	of	these	instances	were	determined	to	be	the	result	of	a	software	issue	unrelated	to	the	interoperability	concept	and	is	considered	a	test	artifact	not	indicative	of	system	performance.	
DAA	Alert	Timing	DAA	alert	timing	was	analyzed	to	assess	the	efficacy	of	JADEM	DAA	alerts	in	a	realistic	environment,	including	stressing	encounter	geometries	and	surveillance	sensor	error.	The	DAA	alert	timing	analysis	was	limited	to	unmitigated	encounters	to	remove	the	influence	of	pilot	actions	on	the	results	and	because	some	of	the	metrics	are	referenced	to	initial	Loss	of	Well	Clear.			
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DAA	Alert	Lead	Time:	Figures	9	and	10	provide	histograms	of	DAA	Corrective	Alert	lead	time	and	DAA	Warning	Alert	lead	time,	respectively.		Lead	time	is	defined	as	the	elapsed	time	between	the	initial	alert	of	a	given	priority	(e.g.	first	DAA	Warning	alert	issued	to	the	UAS	pilot	during	an	encounter)	and	the	initial	LoWC.		The	observed	mean	DAA	Corrective	alert	lead	time	was	46	s	and	the	mean	DAA	Warning	alert	lead	time	was	23	s.		The	lead	time	for	DAA	Corrective	alerts	in	the	absence	of	a	DAA	Corrective	alert	was	assigned	the	same	lead	time	as	the	DAA	Warning	alert;	that	is,	the	first	time	at	which	all	the	alerting	thresholds	for	the	DAA	Corrective	alert	are	met.		When	these	encounters	are	excluded	from	the	analysis,	the	mean	DAA	Corrective	alert	lead	time	is	higher:	49	s.	
		Lead	Time,	tLEAD	(s)	
Figure	9:	DAA	Corrective	Alert	Lead	Time	Histogram		
		Lead	Time,	tLEAD	(s)	
Figure	10:	DAA	Warning	Alert	Lead	Time	Histogram		
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DAA	Alert	Transition	Time:	Alert	transition	time	is	defined	as	the	elapsed	time	between	a	given	alert	priority	level	and	the	next	highest	alert	priority	level	(e.g.	transition	time	between	initial	DAA	Corrective	alert	and	initial	DAA	Warning	alert).	Table	3	provides	the	mean	transition	times	between	alert	priority	levels;	the	results	are	consistent	with	expectations	given	the	modified	tau	values	for	each	alert	level,	as	specified	in	Table	1.		No	firm	conclusions	can	be	drawn	from	the	mean	transition	times	in	Table	3	due	to	the	limited	sample	size	and	operational	coverage	of	the	FT4	encounter	set.	
Table	3:	DAA	Alert	Transition	Time	Alert	Transition	 Mean	Transition	Time	(s)	DAA	Preventive	to	DAA	Corrective	 3.2	s	DAA	Corrective	to	DAA	Warning	 24.9	s	DAA	Warning	to	Well	Clear	Recovery	 19.3	s	Well	Clear	Recovery	to	TCAS	 9.7	s		
DAA	TCAS	Interoperability	As	discussed	in	the	preceding	evaluation	criteria	compliance	section,	compliance	with	the	required	elements	of	the	DAA-TCAS	interoperability	concepts	was	largely	met,	with	few	exceptions	being	the	result	of	JADEM	software	implementation	issues.		Of	note,	two	scenarios	resulted	in	corrective	TCAS	RAs	while	JADEM	deemed	the	ownship	Well	Clear	of	the	intruder	with	green	banding	guidance	at	the	time	of	the	corrective	TCAS	RA.		Further	analysis	by	SC-228	personnel	and	TCAS-II	experts	concluded	that	such	“Well	Clear	RAs”	observed	in	FT4	are	the	result	of	incompatibility	between	DAA	Corrective	Alert	HMD	threshold	(0.75nm)	and	how	HMD	is	used	(or	in	this	case,	NOT	used)	to	filter	TCAS	RAs.		In	these	two	cases,	it	was	concluded	that	TCAS	did	not	consider	HMD	in	issuing	a	corrective	RA	due	to	the	close	proximity	of	the	intruder	and	the	expected	error	in	the	HMD	prediction.		Based	on	this	finding	and	consistent	observations	with	all	systems	under	test	in	FT4,	it	is	recommended	that	the	MOPS	Alerting	requirements	be	refined	to	consider	TCAS	employment	of	the	HMD	filter	and	to	mitigate	its	impact	on	alerting	performance.	
Mode	C	Intruder	Guidance	Stability	Analysis	of	JADEM	guidance	stability	for	intruders	lacking	ADS-B	equipment	was	considered	a	secondary	priority	of	the	data	analysis.		When	Mode	C	surveillance	is	the	only	available	bearing	source	for	the	DAA	system,	a	high	degree	of	bearing	uncertainty	is	to	be	expected.		Unfortunately,	only	three	FT4	JADEM	encounters	included	intruders	with	transponders	but	without	ADS-B	equipage.		Further,	the	JADEM	guidance	for	these	encounters	was	based	on	a	fusion	track	that	included	radar	surveillance	(i.e.,	has	low	bearing	error	within	the	radar	detection	range).		Thus,	while	the	observed	guidance	demonstrated	excellent	stability	for	these	three	encounters,	more	analysis	is	needed	to	draw	any	conclusions	about	the	stability	of	JADEM	DAA	guidance	for	Mode	C	Intruders.		However,	it	is	unclear	if	this	should	be	considered	a	priority	for	further	investigation	given	the	expectation	that	intruders	will	generally	be	within	radar	range	prior	to	the	prescribed	alerting	thresholds	(i.e.	bearing	error	is	not	expected	to	influence	DAA	alerting).	
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WCR	Performance	While	WCR	performance	met	the	objective	criteria	prescribed	in	the	scenario	evaluation	criteria,	FT4	UAS	pilot	participants	subjectively	assessed	WCR	performance	as	lacking	in	a	number	of	areas.		First,	WCR	guidance	stability	was	deemed	poor	for	intruders	lacking	ADS-B	equipage;	such	encounters	demonstrated	multiple	changes	in	the	WCR	guidance	direction	that	pilots	found	distracting	or	lacking	informative	value.		Second,	UAS	pilots	objected	to	WCR	guidance	that	prescribed	turns	to	headings	aft	of	the	current	UAS	course;	such	turns	would	require	significant	deviation	from	planned	route	of	flight,	would	result	in	significant	time	in	close	proximity	for	head-on	encounter	geometries,	and		often	place	non-cooperative	intruders	outside	the	surveillance	volume.		
Concluding	Remarks	and	Recommendations	FT4	provided	a	unique	opportunity	to	evaluate	the	performance	of	a	prototype	UAS	DAA	system	(NASA	JADEM)	across	a	range	of	encounter	conditions	and	in	a	realistic	flight	environment	including	surveillance	system	errors.		However,	as	with	all	flight	tests,	FT4	was	a	tightly	controlled	experiment	with	prior	pilot	knowledge	of	encounter	geometry	and	intruder	“escape”	procedures.		As	such,	while	the	performance	of	the	UAS	DAA	system	employed	in	FT4	is	evaluated	for	the	purpose	of	furthering	MOPS	development,	the	results	must	be	considered	in	the	context	of	FT4	and	in	combination	with	results	from	other	UAS	DAA	experiments	(e.g.	NASA	PT5	and	NASA	PT6,	where	the	UAS	pilots	had	no	advance	knowledge	of	encounters	and	intruder	actions).		However,	whereas	human-in-the-loop	simulations	use	models	of	aircraft	dynamics,	surveillance	sensors	and	atmospheric	phenomena,	flight	test	offers	a	glimpse	at	the	performance	of	the	prototype	UAS	DAA	system	under	real-world	conditions;	it	is	through	this	lens	that	the	performance	of	the	prototype	UAS	DAA	system	is	assessed.	DAA	system	performance	was	assessed	across	five	categories	of	metrics:	Alert	Timing,	UAS	DAA-TCAS	Interoperability,	Mode	C	Intruder	Alert	Stability,	Well	Clear	Recover	Performance	and	a	broad	set	of	Scenario	Evaluation	Criteria.	Observed	alert	lead	times	indicated	acceptable	UAS	DAA	alerting	performance;	mean	DAA	Corrective	and	DAA	Warning	alert	lead	times	were	46	and	23	seconds	respectively.		Excluding	encounters	that	included	turns	toward	the	intruder	(with	the	explicit	purpose	of	creating	immediate	TCAS	RAs),	the	DAA	Corrective	Alert	lead	time	increased	to	49	s.	These	mean	lead	times	are	consistent	with	(albeit	slightly	below)	the	MOPS	average	alert	lead	times	(Section	2.2.4.3.4.),	and	are	indicative	of	acceptable	alerting	thresholds	implemented	within	JADEM	for	FT4.	FT4	included	29	JADEM	scenarios	to	investigate	the	UAS	DAA-TCAS	interoperability	concept.		Results	indicate	effective	interoperability	across	the	range	of	test	conditions	with	one	notable	exception	case:	the	“Well	Clear	RA”.		Observed	for	a	small	number	of	scenarios	(and	across	all	systems	under	test),	UAS	pilots	were	presented	with	a	TCAS	RA	while	the	UAS	DAA	system	had	determined	the	intruder	to	be	Well	Clear.		It	was	determined	that	such	RAs	were	due	to	suppression	of	the	Horizontal	Miss	Distance	(HMD)	criterion	test	when	TCAS	deemed	the	intruder	bearing	information	to	be	of	insufficient	quality.		Because	TCAS	does	not	have	a	quality	bearing	surveillance	source	(e.g.	ADS-B	or	airborne	radar),	such	cases	are	to	be	expected,	and	it	is	recommended	further	analysis	be	conducted	to	determine	the	rate	of	occurrence	of	such	RAs	in	the	NAS	and	potential	mitigations,	if	needed.	Observations	on	the	stability	of	alerts	for	“Mode	C-only	Intruders”	were	limited	to	a	single	scenario	in	FT4.		As	such,	more	data	is	necessary	to	draw	firm	conclusions	on	the	acceptability	of	UAS	DAA	
16		
system	performance	for	such	intruders.	The	concern	regarding	alert	instability	for	Mode-C-only	intruders	stems	from	the	poor	bearing	information	derived	from	transponder	replies	alone.		However,	given	the	airborne	radar	equipage	requirement	and	typical	radar	detection	range,	it	is	unclear	if	such	intruders	represent	a	credible	concern	regarding	alerting	stability;	bearing	error	should	be	a	non-issue	once	the	intruder	is	within	radar	detection	range	.		Further	analysis	of	Mode	C	intruder	alert	stability	should	thus	consider	radar	detection	range	and	the	bearing	performance	of	an	integrated	intruder	track.	Nine	scenarios	were	conducted	to	assess	the	performance	of	UAS	DAA	Well	Clear	Recovery	(WCR)	guidance	to	the	UAS	pilot.		While	observations	indicated	effective	WCR	guidance	for	ADS-B	equipped	intruders,	guidance	was	deemed	largely	ineffective	for	other	intruders	for	a	number	of	reasons.		First,	UAS	pilots	indicated	(and	data	confirmed)	some	directional	instability	in	WCR	guidance;		it	is	recommended	that	additional	heuristics	and/or	hysteresis	be	included	in	WCR	logic	to	prevent	frequent	changes	in	the	directional	WCR	guidance.		Second,	WCR	guidance	occasionally	included	turns	well	beyond	90	degrees	from	the	current	course;		UAS	pilots	found	this	objectionable	and	ineffective.		It	is	recommended	that	WCR	directional	guidance	be	limited	to	turns	of	less	than	some	reasonable	bound	(e.g.	90	degrees	from	current	course).	Finally,	a	broad	set	of	scenario	evaluation	criteria	were	collected	to	assess	high-level	UAS	DAA	system	performance.		Compliance	with	scenario	evaluation	criteria	is	considered	indicative	of	acceptable	UAS	DAA	performance	.	FT4	JADEM	scenario	evaluation	criteria	compliance	exceeded	90%	and	non-compliances	were	assessed	to	be	either	test	artifacts	or	the	results	of	a	(since	corrected)	software	coding	error.		While	no	acceptance	threshold	for	evaluation	criteria	compliance	was	established,	the	observed	high	level	of	compliance	provides	anecdotal	evidence	for	requirements	validation	of	the	alerting	parameters	,	WCR	guidance	logic	and	TCAS	interoperability	concept	implemented	within	JADEM	for	FT4.		Finally,	it	is	important	to	reiterate	that	the	results	presented	herein	are	based	on	a	limited	set	of	scripted	scenarios	executed	in	a	tightly	controlled	flight	test	environment	with	well-rehearsed	and	limiting	pilot	procedures	for	use	of	the	system	under	test;	the	results,	conclusions	and	recommendations	included	in	this	document	provide	key	insights	and	anecdotal	evidence,	but	represent	a	small	fraction	of	the	analyses	necessary	to	fully	validate	the	SC-228	UAS	DAA	MOPS	requirements.	
